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Comments and Casenotes
TESTIMONY BY OBSERVER AS TO SPEED
OF MOVING OBJECT
People's Drug Stores, Inc., v. Windham1
At the trial of this action brought for personal injuries
received as a result of the alleged negligent operation of
defendant's truck, plaintiff called two witnesses who were
asked to estimate the speed of the truck just before the
collision. The elder witness testified that it was proceeding at between fifty and sixty miles per hour, and his son
placed its speed at "at least fifty miles an hour". The evidence showed that the elder witness had driven an automobile for twenty-two years and had made several experiments in "judging speeding". His son had driven automobiles for five years and had often driven trucks. The
witnesses were proceeding to the scene of an earlier accident when they first heard defendant's truck. They were
about a thousand feet from the truck when they first saw
it coming down the highway, and they tried to flag it to
slow down. The truck disappeared from their view about
fifty feet from the scene of the collision. They testified
that the speed of the truck was uniform during the time it
was in their sight. The defendant's objections to the questions were overruled, and he appealed from a judgment
for the plaintiff.
Held, affirmed. An opinion as to the rate of speed of
the truck was justified because of the impossibility or the
difficulty of reproducing data in such and analogous cases.
The Court said that such sensory estimate is
"but a mental impression formed instantly from the
observation of conditions which may not be exactly
reproduced and which ordinarily disappear instantly
...Once the moment of observation has passed the
circumstances affecting it at the time are often but a
memory. The condition of the object, its appearance,
the sounds accompanying its passage, the intangible
impressions left upon the mind of an observer by the
conditions affecting his
judgment can rarely if ever be
2'
exactly reproduced.
1178 Md. 172, 12 A. (2d) 532 (1940).
2-Ibid.,
12 A. (2d) 536.
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The testimony of the witness is direct evidence of an observed fact notwithstanding that it cannot be given with
mathematical precision and is necessarily approximate and
empirical.
Then the Court proceeded to lay down what the law of
this State is as to the qualification of a witness who wishes
to fix the speed of a moving automobile as so much per
hour. It must first be shown that the witness has some
special knowledge which enables him to speak as an "expert". And the Court points out that the term "expert"
means not only one who had special training by study and
observation in estimating the speed of moving objects, but
anyone who had by actual personal experience become
familiar with the operation and speed of automobiles. This
knowledge could be gained through the personal operation
of automobiles for business or pleasure, or as a traffic officer, or through experience in estimating the speed of
moving automobiles operated by others. The Court illustrated how today anyone who operates an automobile must,
to obey the traffic laws, keep an eye on the car's speed. A
driver is likely to note the speed of automobiles which
pass him, or which he passes, in terms of miles per hour.
There is no doubt that the holding in this case is sound,
but the reasoning and terms used are quite confusing. The
Court at the outset points out in detail that such testimony
in the form of an estimate or expression of opinion is admissible as direct evidence of an observed fact. There can
be no quarrel with this part of the Court's opinion that
such an opinion or estimate is the only way such an observable fact could be adequately explained to the jury.
There was no other way for the witnesses to tell the jury
what they saw; it was not possible for the witnesses to describe minutely what took place, so that the jury could
draw its own inference. "While in one sense it is opinion
evidence, in another it is evidence of a fact, and from necessity the courts permit laymen to testify thereto."' Similar
exceptions to the opinion evidence rule in the case of reproducing data are: estimates of distance between two
points, the distance covered by a train; the height of an
object above the ground; the degree of force in a particular
situation; age, area, dimensions and size; elevation and
grade; and other matters of like import.
But the Court goes on to say that a witness is not qualified to give such estimate unless he is an "expert". If, as
the Court says, the testimony was not received under the
83
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exception to the opinion evidence rule in cases of true
expert evidence, but under the other exception for necessary use in reproducing data, why should the Court use
language that is only proper when true expert evidence is
involved?
No plausible explanation can be given for such use,
except that since 1921' the Court has seen fit to call witnesses, who may be allowed to testify as to speed by miles
per hour, "experts". The Court has simply used the term
as a matter of qualification to reproduce data, as well as
a matter of qualification to render an opinion on data laid
before the jury by others.
This confusing use of the term "expert", therefore, calls
for clarification of the two separate exceptions to the opinion rule, namely: (1) the one for expert opinion in the
true sense, and (2) that for opinion as the only feasible
means of reproducing observed data.
Under the exception for true expert opinion, the expert
witness serves as a sort of thirteenth juror, in consciously
making an inference or judgment about data already reproduced for the jury, about which an inference must be
made, and yet where the inference is such a complicated
one that the average lay- juror is incompetent himself to
make it well. This last being so, expert assistance in
making the inference about data otherwise and earlier reproduced to the jury is called for and is furnished by a
duly qualified expert.
The exception for reproducing data is not concerned
with making an inference about data laid before the jury
but with the problem of actually laying such data before
them. It permits any witness to reproduce data observed
by him through the vehicle of an opinion if this is the only
feasible way in which such data may be reproduced for
the jury's benefit, and if said witness has had sufficient
extrinsic experience that the "opinion" he wishes to utter
(as the only way he can express himself meaningfully) is
likely to be an accurate one.
The difference comes to this: True expert opinion involves two separate steps, the laying of the data before the
jury, and the expert's interpretation of it; while the exception for reproducing data involves but one step, i. e., laying
the data before the jury through the medium of an apparent opinion. Furthermore, it is accidental that the true
expert is also the one who lays the data before the jury,
'State

v. United Railways Company, 139 Md. 306, 115 A. 109 (1921).

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. V

it is more than likely that others will do that and he will
interpret it through a hypothetical question, or one based
on his hearing all the testimony; but under the exception
for reproducing data the witness is always stating an opinion about data observed by him in the first instance and
being laid before the jury by him.
The true expert must have such qualifications as make
him competent to render a conscious judgment on data
possibly laid before the jury by others and made available
to him in the same fashion as to the jury; and the person
seeking to offer opinion as the only feasible way of reproducing data must have had sufficient extrinsic experience
with such and similar data that his expressing himself in
the desired fashion will be accurate.
The opinion rule excludes opinions normally because
they are likely to be untrustworthy and to deceive the jury.
But a conscious judgment by a specially qualified person
about a matter where the jury may be "stumped" is, because of the true expert's qualifications, likely to be accurate and so it can be permitted despite the rule. So it is
with an unconscious judgment by any one whose extrinsic
judgments are allowed in evidence about matters otherwise incapable of reproduction. These are likely to be
accurate because of the almost instantaneous nature of
their formation, and because of human custom to think of
one's experiences in terms of such descriptions.
In the Windham case 5 there was involved simply the
matter of reproducing data-it was not a case of a conscious judgment or interpretation of data laid before the
jury by another-and the Court's phrase "expert" really
meant at most only that the person must have sufficient
extrinsic experience with speed to be qualified so to describe his immediate experience. It would have been
better if some other phrase-say "experiential capacity"
-were used for the qualifications to reproduce data in the
first instance by way of an opinion, when necessity forces
the use of such technique. But since Maryland has seen
fit to classify as "experts" witnesses who give an estimate
of the rate of speed of a car they saw moving, we must
not be misled by this term.
However, although the Court of Appeals has adopted
the term "expert" for a witness who testifies as to the
rate of speed, the term is not applied by the Court to witnesses testifying in a similar situation. In Bozman v.
5Supra, n.

I.
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State,6 the Court said that it was not necessary that a witness be an expert to qualify him to express an opinion on
the distance within which a specified automobile, moving
at a specified speed, and under specified conditions, could
be stopped, if he has practical experience with automobiles. Why is there this confusion in the use of the term
"expert"? In this case, it would seem that the true expert
opinion exception was involved, for the witness was answering a hypothetical question. What the Court undoubtedly meant was that one could acquire qualifications
to give a conscious judgment on data separately laid before
the jury by other means than formal study, i. e., by practical experience.
It is difficult to conceive why the Court of Appeals
should have avoided the term expert in the case of the
distance required to stop a car (the Bozman case); and
should have termed a witness who describes the rate of
speed of a car he saw moving as an expert (the Windham
case). There seem to be more compelling reasons why a
witness giving his opinion as to the distance within which
a car could be stopped should be called an "expert" than
one estimating the rate of speed of a car he saw moving.
In the former situation the witness, who did not see the
car at all, is giving his opinion from a hypothetical question. In the latter situation the witness' testimony comes
in, but not under an exception to the opinion evidence
rule in the case of true expert evidence. The reason for
the confusing terminology rests perhaps in the accidental
character of the development of the law in these cases in
Maryland, and might have been avoided by a more studied
approach to the problems of evidence involved.
The present law in Maryland on the qualifications of a
witness to testify to the rate of speed of moving vehicles
had a very interesting, though piecemeal, development.
From 1910 to 1921 the Court of Appeals consistently allowed those who witnessed an accident to testify to the
speed of a train or automobile 7 without ever discussing the
qualifications of the witness or the merits of his opinion.
But in 1921 we find the Court in State v. United Railways
Company8 laying down the broad principles of the rule of
today. The Court said that a witness could not:
- 177 Md. 151, 9 A. 2d 60 (1939).
United Rys. Co. v. Ward, 113 Md. 649, 77 A. 593 (1910) ; W. B. & A.
Rwy. Co. v. Fingles, 135 Md. 574, 109 A. 431 (1920) ; Waltring v. James,
136 Md. 406, 111 A. 125 (1920).
1 Supra, n. 4.
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".. . fix the rate of speed at so much per hour, without having shown some special knowledge which
would enable him to speak as an expert."9
But the Court left us there and failed to state what was
"special knowledge". However, the Court had made a distinction for the first time between the qualifications of a
witness testifying as to the degree of speed and those
testifying as to the rate of speed.
It was necessary to wait until 1924 before we knew
what was "special knowledge" which enabled a witness to
speak as an "expert". In the case of Hopper, McGaw &
Co. v. Kelly 1 the witness qualified as an "expert" when he
testified that he rode in a car every day and that when he
was in a car he observed the speedometer. But in the
principal case the Court has explained more fully what it
had in mind when it used the term "expert" in this connection.
By the weight of authority, the general rule is that any
person of ordinary intelligence, who has had opportunity
for observation, is competent to testify as to the rate of
speed of a moving object. 1 But a substantial minority,1 2
including Maryland, require more-actual personal experience with the operation and speed of automobiles. There
are reasonable grounds for holding the minority decisions
as the better view, especially when one who has driven
for many years realizes how difficult it is to estimate the
rate of speed of an automobile.
Maryland is in full accord with the weight of authority
that such characterizations as "fast", "at a high rate of
speed", "going fast", etc., may be expressed by any witness
qualified by observation and experience, expert or nonexpert, of the speed of a moving automobile which he has
observed. 18 But, as we have seen, the Maryland Court
before 1921 never required any more of a witness who
wished to qualify to testify to the rate of speed. This disSIbid., 139 Md. 306, 309, 115 A. 109, 111 (1921).
145 Md. 161, 125 A. 779 (1924).
8 A. L. R. 692; 70 A. L. R. 540; 94 A. L. R. 1190.
12 Becvar v. Batesole, 218 Iowa 858, 256 N. W. 297 (1934); Morton v.
Holscher, 60 S. D. 50, 243 N. W. 89 (1932) ; Marlow v. Nafziger Baking Co.,
333 Mo. 790, 63 S. W. 2d 115 (1933) ; Denver Omnibus Co. v. Krebs, 255
Fed. 543 (C. C. A. 8th, 1919) ; Porter v. Buckley, 147 Fed. 140 (C. C. A.
3rd, 1906); Schropshire v. Pickwick Stages, 85 Cal. App. 216, 258 P. 1107
(1927) ; Mahoney v. Gooch, 246 Mass. 567, 141 N. E. 605 (1923) ; Faulkner
v. Payne, 191 Mich. 263, 157 N. W. 565 (1916) ; Lewis v. Miller, 119 Neb.
765, 230 N. W. 769 (1930) ; other cases cited, 70 A. L. R. 532.
18 United Rys. & Electric Co. v. Mantik, 127 Md. 197, 96 A. 261 (1915)
5 Am.Jur. 860.
10

11
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tinction that came in 1921 may have resulted because of
the development of the use of automobiles as a more
common form of transportation, and, in which case, people
came to think of speed in terms of miles per hour. However, it would seem to follow that when people became
used to so thinking the need for the distinction existed
even less than in the days when it was not required. This
is not a criticism of the requirement of some experience
to judge speed, but an indication that it came from an
accidental development, and not from forethought about
the rules of evidence.
Granting that the witness had qualified as an "expert",
a very interesting question remains, however. On what
data must the opinion be based in order to come in or have
any probative value?
In Maryland the courts are disposed to let the opinion
of speed go to the jury if the witness observed the vehicle
before the accident, if but for a fleeting moment.1 4 The
testimony of a witness having but a momentary view of an
automobile before it struck another is not, as a matter of
law, without any probative force, but it is for the jury to
decide what weight it wishes to give to such estimate.',
But it seems well-settled elsewhere that when the witness
had no reasonable opportunity to judge the speed of an
automobile, it is error to permit him to do S0.16
There is no doubt that in Maryland an estimate based
solely on an inference will be excluded. In Dashiell v.
Jacoby1 7 a street car motorman did not see the car before
the crash, but he testified that he saw the machine continue
after the crash at a speed of twenty-five miles an hour.
On cross-examination it was brought out that the only reason he could tell why he thought it was going twenty-five
miles an hour was, in his own words, "If a man was only
going eighteen miles an hour, I do not think he would go
over three-quarters of a block before he could stop his
car."' 8 The Court said unequivocally that an opinion:
".. . based on such a false and unreasonable assumption of facts should be stricken out."' 9
What effect do the circumstances surrounding the opportunity to judge speed have? The Louisiana Court ex1, Jackson

v. Leach, 160 Md. 139, 152 A. 813 (1931).
160 Md. 139, 142, 152 A. 813, 815.
6 70 A. L. R. 547.
17 142 Md. 330, 120 A. 751 (1923).
28 Ibid., 142 Md. 330, 335, 120 A. 751, 752.
2" Ibid., 142 Md. 330, 336, 120 A. 751, 753.
15 Ibid.,
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cluded estimates of speed when the vehicle was advancing directly towards the witness,2 0 and when the vehicle
was travelling directly towards witness' car at night with
2 2 the Maryits lights on.2 ' In Taxicab Co. v. Ottenritter
land Court was asked to exclude the opinion of the witness, who saw the car traveling five blocks from the scene
of the accident only, on the ground of its incredibility.
But the Court refused and left it to the jury, who heard
and saw the witness, to determine what weight it would
give the opinion. The question as to the opportunity of
the witness to judge, under the particular circumstances,
as to the speed of an automobile, has been held, as a general
rule, to go to the
weight of his testimony, rather than to its
23
admissibility.
Under the facts in the Windham case 24 it seems that the
witnesses had a splendid opportunity to judge the speed of
the truck. They had a clear and continuous view of the
defendant's truck for nearly a quarter of a mile. They saw
it coming toward them, as it passed them and as it proceeded on beyond them. Can it be said that their testimony was based on an inference? Knowing their experience with automobiles, does it not seem most probable
that when they undertook to flag the truck down they unconsciously were thinking of the speed of the truck in
terms of miles per hour?

RE-SURVEY WARRANT

-

NAVIGABLE WATERS

-

ADVERSE POSSESSION
Gray v. Gray'
In November, 1938, the caveatee applied for and was
granted a special warrant of re-survey from the Commissioner of the Land Office. Under the authority of this
warrant, a survey of the property mentioned therein was
made, and the surveyor filed his certificate in the office
of the Land Commissioner in May, 1939. A few months
later the caveator filed a caveat to the claim of the caveatee, his objection being: -first, that the caveatee could not
20Sout v. Nehi Bottling Co., 146 So. 720 (La. 1933).
21 Mutti v. McCall, 14 La. App. 504, 130 So. 229 (1930).
22 151 Md. 525, 135 A. 587 (1926).
" 70 A. L. R. 543; 94 A. L. R. 1193.
24 Supra, n. 1.
178 Md. 566, 16 A. (2d) 166 (1940).

